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United They Stand? A Study of Authoritarian 
Responses during the Arab Spring 
 
JULIEN MORENCY-LAFLAMME AND ANJA BRUNNER
*
 
 
Abstract This article seeks to analyse why mass protests during the Arab Spring of 2010 did 
not always result in the toppling of authoritarian leaders and why in some cases it actually led to 
the reinforcement of certain authoritarian regimes. In attempting to understand this puzzle, most 
scholars have concentrated on the impact of populist movements but have overlooked the 
importance of the incumbent regime’s divisions and the character of its relationship with 
opposition forces. 
Drawing on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory on transitions “from above”, this research 
demonstrates that authoritarian responses to mass protests were conditioned by the existence of 
divisions within the ruling circle itself. We argue that the only transitions to culminate in the 
establishment of an electoral democracy were those in which mass protests succeeded in 
provoking rifts between softliners and hardliners within the authoritarian elites and in which 
pro-reform forces subsequently negotiated new rules of governance with opposition forces. We 
also distinguish between latent crisis, when tensions within the regime exist but are contained, 
and overt crisis, when the unity of the ruling bloc is broken. We demonstrate our hypothesis by 
comparing events in Bahrain and in Egypt, two cases that led to very different political patterns 
and outcomes following the emergence of popular protest movements. In the case of Egypt, soft-
liners managed to get the upper hand and Mubarak’s National Democratic Party was toppled, 
while in Bahrain the monarchy could count on the support of a majority of the ruling class that 
was largely opposed to political liberalization and ready to quell the opposition coalition. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In January 2011, a surge of national protests in Tunisia fuelled by economic and political 
grievances, forced then-president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to resign and flee the country. In the 
months that followed, a wave of protests that would become known as the “Arab Spring” swept 
across the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). These protests can generally be 
classified into two distinct categories: peaceful popular protests and armed insurrections 
(although there is a great deal of variation within the two categories). On the one hand, the short-
term results of these large scale peaceful protest movements were (a) the removal from power of 
two long-standing authoritarian leaders in Egypt and Tunisia; (b) reforms of the monarchy in 
Morocco; and (c) a renewal and reinforcement of the governments in Jordan and Bahrain. On the 
other hand, armed insurrections in several countries resulted in civil war that led to (d) the 
resignation of President Saleh without a major change in the government in Yemen; (e) the 
overthrow of the Gadhafi government and a very tentative attempt at democracy in Libya; and (f) 
an ongoing bloody confrontation between different factions in Syria. Focusing on the first 
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category of uprisings (largely non-violent civic resistance campaigns), the objective of our article 
is to elucidate the dissimilar results of those protests. It is important to note that we do not seek 
to explain the trajectories and outcomes of the second category of uprisings, meaning violent 
confrontation ending in civil war. Furthermore, our research focuses on two divergent results, 
regime resilience or regime change. 
Social scientists and commentators have proposed various theories to understand the 
causes and consequences of the 2011-12 wave of mass protests in the MENA region. These 
scholars generally discuss variables such as the reinforcement of civil society, the integration of 
social media, the consequences of international pressures, and the effects of economic policies 
on the social composition of MENA states.
1
 Most studies on the matter pay little attention to the 
dynamics within authoritarian regimes.
2
 This neglect is puzzling, given that democratization 
specialists nearly unanimously agree on the importance of this variable to explain the success or 
failure of democratic transitions since 1974.
3
 
Following O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 1986 influential publication “Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies”, studies of democratic transitions have analysed rifts within ruling 
coalitions as key determinants of regime change. Specifically, these theorists argue that the status 
quo is broken when reformist factions, or softliners, within the ruling coalition, gain the upper 
hand and ally themselves with moderate opposition forces.
4
 Inversely, when defenders of the 
status quo (hardliners) are preponderant, there is little opportunity for regime change. The 
success of such an agreement depends on the ability of opposition moderates to keep popular 
protest contained, as the dynamics of these mass protests carry the risk of radicalization and of 
derailing the transition project.
5
  
                                                 
1
 On civil society, see Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of 
Military‐Opposition Alliances”, Swiss Political Science Review 17/4 (2011), pp. 485-491. On the integration of 
social media: Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, “The Role of Digital Media”, Journal of Democracy 
22/3 (2011), pp. 35-48; Habibul Haque Khondker, “Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring”, Globalizations 83/5 
(2011), pp. 675-679; A. Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt's January 25 Uprising”, 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 35(2011). On international pressures: Daniel S. Morey et al., “Leader, Follower, or 
Spectator? The Role of President Obama in the Arab Spring Uprisings”, Social Science Quarterly 93/5 (2012), pp. 
1185-1201. On effects of economic policies: Sarah A. Tobin, “Jordan's Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-
Revolution”, Middle East Policy 19/1 (2012), pp. 96-109; George Joffé, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins 
and Prospects”, The Journal of North African Studies 16/4 (2011), pp. 507-532. 
2
 With the exception of certain articles focusing on the role of the armed forces, including Ibrahim A. Karawan, 
“Politics and the Army in Egypt”, Survival 53/2 (2011), pp. 43-50; Zoltan Barany, “The Role of the Military”, 
Journal of Democracy 22/4 (2011), pp. 24-35; Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The Military Amidst Uprisings and Transi-
tions in the Arab World” In Fawad A. Gerges (ed) The New Middle East: Protests and Revolutions in the Arab 
World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.180-208; Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: 
Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya”, Foreign Affairs 90/3 (2011), pp. 2-7; Eva Bellin, “Re-
considering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East : Lessons from the Arab Spring”, Comparative 
Politics 44/2, pp. 127-149. 
3
 Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations”, Comparative Political Studies 
33/6-7 (2000), p. 707. 
4
 See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies”, in 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Prospects for Democracy, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 16. 
5
 Terrly Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America”, Comparative Politics 23/1 (1990), pp. 1-21; 
Enrique A Baloyra, Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the 
Southern Cone (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1987). 
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A second generation of research on democratic transition has brought more emphasis on 
the importance of civil society groups.
6
 According to these theories, the involvement of civil 
society in transitions is crucial in pushing through regime change, as authoritarian elites base 
their calculations of whether or not to open up the regime on their assessment of opposition 
strength.
7
 Popular participation of civil society in mass protests ensures that the costs of 
repressing dissent outweigh the costs of liberalizing, therefore making a regime transition more 
favourable.
8
 Recently, scholars of regime resilience have argued that the specific characteristics 
of regime and opposition forces are a primary determinant of regime defections.
9
 More 
specifically, rivalries between members of the ruling coalitions are often mediated by institutions 
like political parties or authoritarian legislatures.
10
 Taking into account these recent 
developments, we theorize that divisions between softliners and hardliners occur as the result of 
two differentiated but related types of regime crisis: latent crisis (in this case internal rivalries 
within authoritarian regimes) and overt crisis (when internal fissures within the regime interact 
with larger challenges to the regime’s survival – namely massive popular protests). The 
interaction of these two crises presents an opportunity for regime change.
11
 
The democratization literature has yet to extensively analyse the importance of elite 
factionalism during the Arab Spring. Instead, studies tend to highlight the causes, composition 
and demands of opposition movements to the detriment of the balance of power within the 
authoritarian ruling clique. We intend to fill this gap by studying the importance of internal 
regime dynamics in response to popular protests in Bahrain and Egypt between 2010 and 2012. 
In both cases protests reached more than 100,000 participants and involved both new civil 
society groups and already established regime opponents. Furthermore, the government in both 
states was lobbied by western state representatives, particularly American representatives, to 
show restraint and not to repress opponents. Finally, important regime figures publicly declared 
that they were in favour of some of the protesters’ demands in the few weeks that followed the 
initial protests. Still, only in Egypt did this lead to leadership change. 
In applying these observations to the Arab Spring rebellions, we argue that popular 
mobilization led to regime change only when the ruling coalition was already fractured and the 
stronger factions within the coalition favoured political liberalization. Through a comparison of 
Bahrain and Egypt, we highlight how the differences in the relative strength of the factions 
within their respective regimes and the characteristics of the opposition coalitions influenced the 
outcomes. In Bahrain, hardliners were predominant and succeeded in quelling the popular 
uprising, while in Egypt softliners cooperated with the opposition forces and toppled Hosni 
Mubarak. We do not seek to explain the causes of successful transition to democracy in the 
                                                 
6
 See Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions”, 
Comparative politics (1997), pp. 305-322; Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: 
Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World”, World politics 54/2 (2002), pp. 212-244; Valerie Bunce, 
“Rethinking Recent Democratization”, World politics 55/2 (2003), pp. 171-72. 
7
 Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization”. 
8
 Guillermo O'Donnell, “Schmitter's Retrospective: A Few Dissenting Notes”, Journal of Democracy 21/1 (2010), p. 
30. 
9
 See Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization.  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Nicolas Van de Walle, "Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?" In A. Schedler (ed) 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), pp. 
77-94. 
10
 Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, p. 37. 
11
 Ibid, p. 42; Joy Langston. “Elite ruptures: When do ruling parties split?” In Andreas Schedler (ed) Electoral Au-
thoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p. 59. 
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MENA region, solely whether popular uprisings were quelled or led to regime change. Through 
this analysis, we hope to (1) bring into light the importance of regime factionalism during the 
Arab Spring and (2) provide a new model through which regime crisis can be analysed into crisis 
sequences, both within the ruling circles and broader societal forces, and how regime and civil 
society characteristics shape regime crisis outcome.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
Four concepts are critical to our analysis: softliners, hardliners, latent crisis and overt crisis. We 
use the concepts established by Schmitter and O’Donnell in Transition from Authoritarian Rule 
(and employed in many democratic studies publications afterwards) to conceptualize political 
factions within the regimes we analyse.
12
 Softliners are regime members open to discussion with 
moderate opposition forces and in favour of political liberalization, while hardliners place a high 
value on the maintenance of the status quo and oppose the opening of the political sphere or 
cooperation with other social forces. A latent crisis is marked above all by tensions between 
different factions of the ruling “clique” that compete for influence within the regime. Such 
tensions may persist for an extended period of time without necessarily threatening the cohesion 
of the regime. In fact, authoritarian leaders put in place institutions, such as authoritarian 
parliaments and political councils, as mechanisms to effectively manage such rivalries.
13
 Events 
outside the regime’s control (such as economic crisis, military defeat, the death of a charismatic 
leader, long-term economic or political grievances) which are accompanied by increased political 
mobilization in civil society can challenge regime unity. In this case, a latent crisis can turn into 
an overt crisis as certain factions try to gain the upper-hand by appealing to opposition leaders 
and publicly endorsing political liberalization. For example, Lee concluded that in Indonesia 
(1998) and the Philippines (1986), prior to their respective transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy, there had been rivalries between military factions for decades. Only when civil 
society groups launched a series of large-scale protests, however, did some factions in both of 
these cases appeal to social groups outside of the ruling coalition for support in their bid for 
power.
14
 In other words, overt crises are moments where rivalries are no longer contained within 
the regime structures, as members of the regime seek political backing from outside forces in an 
effort to gain an advantage over their political rivals.
15
 
We verify our hypothesis through a small-N comparison; this comparative method is used 
when researchers want to demonstrate the importance of a given variable and control the 
                                                 
12
 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies”, in 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Prospects for Democracy, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 15-17. For others articles 
using the same category, see Jason Brownlee. “… And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in 
Neopatrimonial Regimes”. Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 37/3, (2002) pp. 35-63; Richard 
Snyder “Explaining Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes” Comparative Politics, 24/4 (1992), pp. 379-399. 
13
 In fact, authoritarian leaders put in place institutions, such as authoritarian parliaments and political councils, as 
mechanism to effectively manage such rivalries. See Brownlee. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization, p. 
37. 
14
 Terrence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 
1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia”, Comparative Political Studies, 42/5, (2008), pp. 640-669. 
15
 Langston. “Elite ruptures”, p. 59. 
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influence of others.
16
 By contrasting the political evolution of both regimes, we demonstrate the 
importance of the variable studied in the article and how variations in the degree of elite unity, 
and the various attitudes towards protesters’ demands, affected the regime’s response to these 
demands. We analyse this regime rivalry over two periods: (1) in the decade which preceded the 
Arab Spring (the latent crisis) and (2) during the Arab Spring (the overt crisis) between 2010 and 
2012. 
We selected two cases for this study: Bahrain and Egypt. In both of these cases, the 
authoritarian regime in place had already showed signs of strain prior to the beginning of mass 
mobilization in 2011, but the existing dissent was never sufficient to break up the unity of the 
ruling block. In Egypt, for example, the military mobilized in 2003 in a bid to prevent Gamal 
Mubarak from claiming leadership in the event of his father’s death. In Bahrain, the king 
publicly announced in 2008 that all ministers would have to follow the crown prince’s reform 
path. In both cases, opposition parties had been active before the sustained campaigns of popular 
protests that arose in early 2011. These two examples were selected because in both cases 
opposition was on a larger scale than in other countries, with hundreds of thousands of protesters 
present at key sites. 
Unlike the Egyptian case, Bahrain’s revolutionary moment was short-lived. We suggest 
that this is due to the fact that the internal crisis between hardliners and softliners within the 
Bahraini monarchy ended with the hardliners emerging as the strongest.
17
 In Egypt, the partisans 
of Gamal Mubarak were thwarted by softliners within the armed forces who were willing to 
accept the election of civilian leaders and the integration of Islamists and liberals into the 
political system.
18
 In fact, our two divergent cases exemplify not only the importance of 
softliners emerging on top in the power struggle between authoritarian regime factions, but also 
provides evidence that popular movements can initiate a transition process by transforming latent 
dissensions among authoritarian regime factions into an overt regime crisis. 
There are certain differences between the Bahrain and Egypt scenarios which must be 
examined in order to assess their impact on the phenomenon we studied. Both regimes were 
authoritarian in nature, but Egypt was a dominant-party regime while Bahrain was, and still is, a 
constitutional monarchy. While it is true that certain types of authoritarian regimes are more 
likely to suffer from regime defections and even collapse, single-party systems and monarchies 
are the most stable forms of authoritarian regimes.
19
 To the extent that authoritarian regimes vary 
in their composition and have individual dynamics, blanket regime categories do not offer a 
sufficient explanation for this article’s puzzle.20 Both states had created multiparty legislatures 
before the Arab Spring (unlike many states of the MENA region), though in both cases elections 
and legislation largely advantaged political parties close to the ruling elite. Overall, the 
differences in the composition of these regimes do not appear to have been a significant factor in 
the outcomes discussed here. 
                                                 
16
 Alexander L. George and Andrew. Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
(Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, 2005),p. 155; Peter A. Hall, “Systematic Process Analysis: When and 
How to Use it”, European Management Review 3/1 (2006), p. 27. 
17
 Gregg Carlstrom, “In the Kingdom of Tear Gas”, Middle East Research and Information Project (April 13, 2012). 
18
 Tarek Masoud, “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square”, Journal of Democracy 22/3 (2011), p. 23. 
19
 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data-
set” Perspectives on Politics, 12/02 (2014), p. 320. 
20
 Borrowing the definitions of Henry and Springborg, Egypt is a bully praetorian republic while Bahrain is a global-
izing monarchy. See Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in 
the Middle East (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 134 & 168. 
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Another factor that can influence the outcome of an overt crisis is the amount of resources 
available for each regime; resilient regimes, unlike those that fall, would have sufficient means to 
provide perks and other incentives that might prevent regime defection.
21
 While Bahrain had 
larger oil revenues, both states had been in prolonged periods of economic growth from 2000 
onward which benefitted the members of the regime.
22
 Therefore, the resource argument cannot 
explain the defection or non-defection of regime members from the ruling circle. A third factor is 
that foreign actors played different roles in both states. While the United States lobbied the 
Egyptian military to tolerate the opposition mobilization, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar sent 
troops to Bahrain in support of the regime. The importance of this factor, however, is 
undermined by the fact that in each case rifts within the two ruling cliques were already in place 
before foreign actors attempted to lobby for their favoured outcome. Furthermore, while the 
spectre of Iranian interference and the subsequent military intervention by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) Defence Force did help to bolster the regime, the military intervention by the 
GCC members happened after the beginning of the crackdown by security forces on protesters.
23
 
While the fear of Iranian interference did play a role in the formation of hardline factions within 
the Bahraini regime, it has more to do with the composition of the regime (mostly Sunni) against 
the predominantly Shi’ite background of Bahraini society. These sectarian differences played a 
much bigger role in Bahrain than in Egypt, where Coptic-Muslim relations, while sometimes 
tense, have not been used by Mubarak’s regime as an important means of regime resilience. 
These sectarian relations, as we explore later in this article, are an important part of our 
framework because the use of identity as a proxy for regime loyalty meant that the Bahraini 
regime privileged certain groups to assure their allegiance. In other words, it is not the presence 
of sectarian groups that was responsible for the high degree of power held by the Sunni-led army 
and government, but rather that certain groups realized that their privileges were tied to the status 
quo.
24
 
When investigating the genesis and development of a crisis under an authoritarian regime, 
however, scholars often face a practical constraint: the lack of visible or reliable indicators of 
divisions within authoritarian regimes, which forces them to rely instead on proxy measures.
25
 In 
the face of such difficulties, we have focused on whether or not changes in circumstances may 
have increased risks for certain key factions and led them to change their preferences.
26
 Such 
changes can include (1) shifting alliances between members of the authoritarian elite and 
opposition parties, (2) the end of the involvement of certain actors within the authoritarian 
regime, (3) the rise of new independent actors, (4) the imminent death of the founder of the 
regime or (5) the promotion of liberalization by authoritarian regime partisans in an effort 
safeguard their interests. These indicators, we argue, can be used to identify ‘latent’ splits within 
the ruling coalitions, but not ‘overt’ splits. 
An indicator of increased factionalism during the ‘overt’ crisis is public disagreements 
with the regime. Following this logic, our proxy measures of a regime crisis are designed to 
                                                 
21
 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 65. 
22
 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook” (April 2014), online: http://www.imf.org/. 
23
 For instance, the February 2011 take-over by security forces of the symbolic Pearl Roundabout was clearly a sign 
that hardliners were willing to act without the support of foreign troops. 
24
 See Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion.” Comparative Politics 42/3 
(2010): pp. 338-340. 
25
 Martins, “The ‘Liberalization’ of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil”, p. 75. 
26
 Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy”, p. 55. 
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identify softliners on the basis of their public actions, namely (1) the proposition of credible, 
serious and committed reform plans, and (2) public discourse denouncing the regime and/or its 
policies, including the appeal for outside support. Furthermore, (3) the defection of key regime 
supporters, such as the armed forces, and the refusal to obey orders by certain government 
branches are also good indicators of a regime-split.
27
 Finally, a regime crisis involves a power 
struggle between different factions of a previously united ruling block. These struggles, which 
are also indicators of the presence of softliners, can be observed in (4) erratic policy changes 
when different branches of government speak or act in an ostensibly uncoordinated fashion. 
We also assess how popular mobilization during the Arab Spring relates to the “fear of the 
masses” argument defended by many authors. Many scholars have argued that the success of 
bargaining in democratic transitions depends in a large part on the ability of opposition 
moderates to marginalise radicals.
28
 According to McFaul, mobilized masses “spoil the party” by 
frightening potential regime softliners and driving them closer to the hardline faction.
29
 If protest 
movements are perceived as intense threats, “even bland regime actors will conclude that the 
costs of toleration are greater than those of repression” and the movement for democracy will 
fail.
30
 Bahrain is a prime example in support of such an argument. 
 
 
Egypt’s Nile Revolution 
 
In January 2011, the Egyptian regime was challenged by one of the largest protest 
movements the country had ever seen. Faced with growing pressure and the police’s failure to 
end the daily protests, President Hosni Mubarak, a former army officer, called for the army to 
intervene and save his regime. The army had been the cornerstone of Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party (NDP)’s rule over Egypt and yet, despite this historical relationship, the 
army’s high command refused to help the NDP government. 
The explanation for the army’s refusal to support the NDP lies in the evolution of the 
relationship between these groups. The army, which was slowly removed from the political 
sphere in the 1990s, now faced economic marginalization with the preparation of Gamal 
Mubarak’s ascendency to the presidency. The January 2011 protests became an opportunity for 
the armed forces to push their rivals out of the regime. In exchange for certain guarantees 
towards its corporate interests, the armed forces’ high command accepted the rise of a new 
                                                 
27
 O'Donnell and Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies”, p. 25; Przeworski, “Some 
Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy”, p. 56; Antony Oberschall, "Opportunities and Framing in 
the Eastern European Revolts of 1989," in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural 
Framing, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 100. 
28
 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies"; S. Huntington, “The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the 21 century”; (Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), T. Karl, “Dilemmas 
of Democratization in Latin America”.  
29
 Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World”, World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002), pp. 212-244. 
30
 Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions” in L. Ander-
son (ed), Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press 1999), p. 98. 
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civilian government. In the words of Kandil: “the sudden collapse of the regime in 2011 was the 
cumulative result of the six decades of power struggles within the ruling coalition.”31 
 
The Egyptian Armed Forces Before 2000 
 
The Egyptian armed forces have played a critical role in their country’s political sphere since the 
Young Officers’ coup of 1952. In the mid-twentieth century all of the state’s leaders were picked 
from the Egyptian army. Mubarak, however, continued a process of civilianization initiated by 
Anwar Sadat in 1973 and, by 2011, only a few cabinet ministers had any military background.
32
 
The military officers were, increasingly, kept out of day-to-day politics.
33
 In the background, 
however, the armed forces remained very powerful. For example, nearly all of the regional 
governors appointed by Mubarak were former military officers.
34
 For the most part, as Norton 
has argued, the Egyptian generals used their veto-like power from behind the scenes.
35
 
In an effort to gain more autonomy from the army, Mubarak also tended to keep the armed 
forces away from domestic crises. By the 1980s, regime maintenance missions were given to 
new security institutions, most of them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.
36
 
The budget and size of these security institutions continuously expanded from the end of the 
1980s.
37
 As Droz-Vincent has argued, one of the objectives of another non-military institution, 
the Mukhabarat, was to counterbalance the power of the regular army high command.
38
 In an 
effort to curb the army’s desire for political participation, changes in the army’s command were 
also implemented, as older officers were pushed into retirement and replaced with younger 
officers who had been trained to remain apolitical.
39
 Furthermore, hundreds of officers were 
forced into retirement.
40
 By the 2000-2010 period, the police, according to Kandil, was the 
preeminent powerful political force and formed a sort of state within the state.
41
 
Still, the Mubarak regime required the army’s support to maintain its rule, especially in the 
face of increased domestic and international pressure to implement more thorough political 
reforms. To do so, the NDP leadership offered a series of economic perks to the military. 
Officers, both individually and as a corporate entity, were given the opportunity to purchase 
large segments of Egypt’s agricultural lands as well as private companies. The armed forces 
owned factories run by various parastatal companies, including the National Service Projects 
                                                 
31
 See Hazem Kandil Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (New York: Verso, 2012), p. 220. It 
should be noted that Kandil predicted that the post-revolution dynamics would be a constant confrontation between 
the police and the army for political power. 
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Organization, and, in 2007, they also became the owner of the Alexandria shipyard.
42
 Over time, 
the armed forces bought and developed companies in various economic sectors, ranging from the 
manufacturing of basic household appliances to commercial construction.
43
 Furthermore, many 
former military officers can be found within the civil service, in the National Assembly where 
many of the seats reserved for workers and farmers are filled by retired officers, and in the many 
parastatal companies. While the exact economic weight of the companies controlled by the army 
is unknown, most estimates place it somewhere between five and forty per cent of Egypt’s 
GDP.
44
 These developments led to a number of political dynamics which largely influenced both 
Mubarak’s rule and the transitional process. First, as Faris has concluded, while the regime kept 
the military out of daily affairs, a military enclave or ‘deep state’ developed where military 
officers present in most state institutions exerted a large influence, if not control, over political 
officials.
45
 Second, there was a growing separation between the interests of Mubarak and of the 
military command as the latter began to define their own corporate interests as being different 
from the regime’s.46 
 
The Latent Crisis: Gamal Mubarak and the Armed Forces’ Clashing Visions 
 
The 2000-2011 period was marked by rising tensions within the NDP ruling coalition because 
the military was challenged by a rising clique composed of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the 
president, and close associates of his who were mostly private entrepreneurs, bankers and 
industrialists.
47
 Gamal and his allies joined the NDP and began to monopolize power within the 
party-ranks. As Brownlee has explained, by 2000 Gamal’s “New Guard” began to win internal 
elections and rules began to be changed to increase their power over rival factions.
48
 Once 
dominant within the NDP structures, the oligarchs slowly took control of key government 
branches like the police and the interior ministry.
49
 Even other political forces were slowly being 
pushed-out in an effort to assure Gamal’s ascendancy and, as a result, guarantee that he would 
become his father’s successor. Electoral rules were changed to deny electoral victories to the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and, as with Ayman Nour in 2005, arrest and harassment were used 
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during elections to assure the NDP’s victory.50 This New Guard’s main clash was not with 
regime opponents, but was instead with other members of the ruling coalition and particularly 
with the military. Under the new government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, the NDP engaged 
in a large privatization campaign between 2004 and 2011.
51
 This economic liberalization 
program was aggressive and had major implications. Cole has estimated that between 1991 and 
2011, 150 of the 314 state owned factories had been sold to private interests.
52
 As Ottaway 
reported in 2010: “In the mid-1980s, the state controlled two-thirds of the economy; now the 
same proportion belongs to the private sector.”53 
The armed forces, which had large economic interests in many of these state corporations, 
did not favour moves which placed companies formerly in their control under the ownership of 
the oligarchs of the New Guard. On various occasions, Omar Suleiman, director of the 
intelligence program, and Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, defence minister and head of the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), found themselves in power struggles with Gamal over the 
policy direction of the regime. While Hosni Mubarak considered the succession a fait accompli, 
certain elements within the army were considering alternative plans. In 2003, when the president 
fainted and was rushed to the hospital, the armed forces moved rapidly in their bid for power and 
sent tanks into the streets of Cairo.
54
 As Colombier reported, “significant signals suggested that 
the military was opposed to Gamal, and that in case Hosni Mubarak were to die before the end of 
his mandate, the military would seize power rather than let the son succeed his father”.55 There 
was even talk of a coup d’état by some of the most disgruntled officers.56 There were, to sum up, 
tensions within the ruling coalition on the eve of the Nile Revolution. While these tensions were 
not sufficient to challenge the stability of the regime, as the January-February 2011 protests 
demonstrated, they greatly weakened the Mubarak’s power base and were a necessary factor in 
his downfall. 
 
The Nile Revolution: The Overt Crisis 
 
The protests that began on 25 January 2011 became the greatest challenge that the NDP ever 
faced as it became rapidly clear that the internal security services were failing to contain the 
protesters. The security services, as Chalcraft reported, were unprepared for crowd control and, 
by the end of January 2011, the only units still intact were the Presidential Guard units stationed 
around the national TV station and the presidential palace.
57
 By January 28, the government had 
                                                 
50
 See Dina Shehata, “The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End”, Foreign Affairs 90 
(2011), p. 29; Ann M. Lesch, “Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution”, Middle East Policy 18/ 3 (2011), p. 39; 
Brownlee, “The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak”, p. 48. 
51
 Droz-Vincent, “The Military Amidst Uprisings and Transitions in the Arab World”, p. 188. 
52
 Juan Cole, “Egypt’s Modern Revolution and the Fall of Mubarak” In Fawad A. Gerges (ed) The New Middle East: 
Protests and Revolutions in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 74. 
53
 Ottaway, “Egypt at the Tipping Point?”, p. 4. 
54
 Roger Owen, The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 
144 
55
 Virginie Collombier, “Egypt in 2011: A Regime that No Longer Knows How to Adapt? Fluid Conjunctures and 
Regime Transformations in Perspective”, EUI Working Papers 3 (2012), p. 7. 
56
 Aclimandos, “Armée populaire”, p. 325. 
57
 He also estimated that around 80 police stations were burned in this period. See John Chalcraft, “Egypt’s 25 Janu-
ary Uprising, Hegemonic Contestation, and the Explosion of the Poor”, In Fawad A. Gerges (ed) The New Middle 
East: Protests and Revolutions in the Arab World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 175-176. 
New Middle Eastern Studies 5 (2015) 
11 
 
called on the army to put down the protest.
58
 In the words of Hashim: “As the regime found itself 
backed into a corner, with the police and CSF [Central Security Forces] having a hard time 
suppressing the teeming masses in Tahrir Square, the military emerged openly on the political 
scene for the first time in year.”59 
Although Mubarak had hoped the army would rapidly end the protests, two factors seemed 
to have precluded the military high command from doing so. First, there were fears within the 
high command that any decision to use force against peaceful protesters would lead to rebellions 
among the military ranks. Second, the participants in the protests came from diverse 
backgrounds and could not be attached to a specific political party or organization.
60
 This diverse 
group, like the armed forces, had major economic grievances against the New Guard and the 
consequences of its economic policies.
61
 In addition, there was a great reluctance to defend a 
regime which, in the words of Chalcraft, would “sell off the country to Gamal’s clique”.62 The 
army’s neutral stand between 28 January and 11 February made apparent the ambivalence of 
SCAF and senior officers. Rather than end the protests, the army protected the buildings 
surrounding Tahir Square. In this period, the regime was purged entirely of the New Guard as the 
government was dismissed on 29 January and, six days later, Gamal himself was expelled from 
the NDP. As Masoud has pointed out, the military effectively used the protesters to remove their 
most powerful opponents from the ruling circles.
63
 
At this point, with its rival eliminated, the armed forces could have decided to suppress the 
opposition movement and secure Hosni Mubarak as president, but as the protests continued, 
SCAF instead began to distance itself from Mubarak. Many officers had even publicly endorsed 
the protesters’ demands.64 SCAF also unofficially appointed certain officers, including Sami 
Annan, Mamdouh Shahin and Mohsen al-Fanagry, to negotiate with civil society groups.
65
 On 10 
February, the Mubarak-SCAF rupture was complete as the council met for the first time without 
the president and his vice-president, Omar Sulayman.
66
 Also on 10 February, General Hassan al-
Roueini, in charge of the Cairo Brigades, told the protesters that “all your demands will be met 
today”.67 The following day, Tantawi announced he would take over the government and that 
SCAF would lead Egypt during the transitional period. 
The Nile Revolution marked two important dynamics. The first was the rupture between 
the military, the president and the New Guard. While there were frictions beforehand, the 
protesters provided the opportunity for the military to actually act on their grievances against 
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Gamal’s clique. Furthermore, the failure of Hosni Mubarak to come to an agreement with 
representatives of the protesters pushed the military to negotiate with the protesters themselves. 
The protests were the catalyst for the military-government rupture. 
 
Regime Change in Egypt 
 
After these events, negotiations occurred between SCAF, the Islamist forces and a loose 
coalition of secular groups. While the armed forces made no attempt during that period to install 
a new permanent military regime, they made a number of demands, namely the return to social 
peace, a limited scope of reforms and the defence of its corporate interests.
68
 In exchange, they 
offered to lift the ban of important political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the 
Salafis. Nevertheless, the relationship between the army high command and the secular forces 
deteriorated. 
SCAF, having an interest in a rapid restoration of order and peace, sided with the MB, 
calculating that they would be best positioned to control the street protests.
69
 Faris has 
interpreted this political development as the co-option of the Islamists into the Mubarak-era 
political system which was still mostly intact.
70
 In a referendum supported by the MB and the 
Salafis, the Egyptian electorate approved political reforms proposed by SCAF.
71
 This reform 
package included term limits for the presidency and judicial oversight of elections.
72
 
Furthermore, the MB partisans remained largely outside of the continuing protests after February 
2011.
73
 In exchange for support of its favoured political reform package, the new civilian 
government gave its consent to the economic privileges and autonomy from government 
supervision that the military had granted itself.
74
 The election, as Faris pointed out, was the last 
liberal-islamist entente as both groups worked together to prevent Ahmed Shafiq, the candidate 
favoured by the army, from winning the presidency.
75
 In the presidential election of May-June 
2012, the armed forces abided by the results of the vote and Mohamed Morsi of the MB became 
president.
76
 
 The period between May 2011 and the end of 2012 was marked by two dynamics which 
largely influenced the fate of Egypt’s transition: the provisional entente between the armed 
forces and the MB, and the schism between secular forces and Islamists moderates. As 
mentioned above, the agreement between the SCAF and MB leadership shaped the post-
Mubarak institutions as both actors agreed to limit political reforms and allow a large degree of 
autonomy for the military over their own spheres of activity. This agreement appeared to have 
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ensured both regime change and that the armed forces return to their barracks.
77
 However, the 
schism between these two forces and the secular groups meant that the main proponent for more 
thorough political reforms was cut out of the entire process. The liberal-secularist demands were 
largely ignored as the MB and SCAF agreed on a limited reform agenda.
78
 The entrenchment of 
authoritarian structures with limited political reforms and the maintenance of large military 
prerogatives meant that the new political system that came out of the Nile Revolution fell short 
of the standards of an electoral democracy. In short, the military reformers-opposition forces 
entente brought a regime change in Egypt, but it failed to bring greater government 
accountability. The social forces behind the revolution were increasingly marginalized by SCAF 
and the new MB government. 
 
 
Bahrain: The Repression of the Opposition Movement 
 
We now turn to analysing Bahrain. We will demonstrate that whereas dissent within the Bahraini 
monarchy had been present throughout the years leading up to the Arab Spring, it was not a 
threat to the internal unity of the ruling block. However when massive demonstrations against 
the regime started to rock the island, these tensions transformed into an overt crisis with the 
crown prince publicly announcing a dialogue on political reforms. This initial willingness to 
compromise was overtaken by events, as the radicalization of opposition groups enabled the 
ascension of hardliner elements within the regime. The hardliners, by gaining the support of the 
moderate King Hamad, outmanoeuvred the crown prince. Consequently, proposals for a dialogue 
on political reforms were called off and dissent was crushed with the help of mainly GCC 
military forces. 
 
Bahrain’s Latent Crisis: The Years Before the Arab Spring 
 
The internal conflicts and manoeuvrings between different factions of Bahrain’s monarchy 
predate the 14 February uprising of 2011. In fact, for the previous decade, King Hamad bin Isa 
Al Khalifa had been arbitrating between two main power centres: one led by reform-minded 
Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, the other led by Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman 
Al Khalifa, the king’s uncle and head of what Louer labels “the dynasty’s old guard” (also called 
the “Khawalids”).79 Until the outbreak of the Arab Spring rebellion in Bahrain, Crown Prince 
Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa was largely considered the rising figure within the monarchy; 
according to Louer, he was “young, Western educated, and liberal-minded” and “he has long 
been the sweetheart of Western diplomats” due to his conviction that reform is necessary to 
ensure that “the regime bends but does not break under popular pressure”.80 Prince Salman 
gained influence largely with the help of a broad reform project called “Economic Vision 2030” 
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which was considered by many observers as a direct challenge to the way the Prime Minister 
Khalifa had been handling the economy since Bahrain’s independence from Britain in 1971.81 
By this point, Khalifa had come to be the leader of a faction of Sunnis who feared Shi’ite 
empowerment in the event of democratic change. Together with the Royal Court Minister 
Khaled bin Ahmed al Khalifa and the minister of defence and commander-in-chief of the Army 
Khalifa bin Ahmed al Khalifa, Khalifa formed a triumvirate of regime hardliners with the firm 
conviction that every step towards reform was a slippery slope towards the end of the al-Khalifa 
family’s reign. Furthermore, Khaled bin Ahmed al Khalifa was suspected to be a sponsor of 
radical Sunni Islamist movements, a claim endorsed by many specialists.
82
 Essentially, the 
Khawalids represented “the last of the old lions”, whereas the crown prince and his circle of 
technocrats were considered to be Bahrain’s future, with King Hamad somewhere between the 
two, “understanding that reform is critical to Bahrain’s success but unable to turn his back on 
tradition and the stability it provides”.83 
Tensions surfaced for the first time in 2001, when Prince Salman officially became heir to 
the throne. Acting on behalf of his father King Hamad, he chaired a committee to implement the 
National Action Charter (NAC) which changed the Bahraini government from an absolute to a 
constitutional monarchy. Khalifa was said to be highly skeptical of these developments and later 
pushed the king to abandon many of his reform plans, enstating further limitations on the power 
of Bahrain's parliament.
84
 A few years later, in 2006, a public report written by a Sudanese-
British advisor to the Bahrain government pointed out the increasing power of the Khawalid 
faction and accused them of leading a secret campaign to undermine reformers within the ruling 
family. The report identified Ahmed Ativallah, the then-head of Bahrain’s intelligence services 
and the nephew of the royal court minister, as the leader of this campaign. “That was when 
things started going wrong”, a senior member of the ruling family later recalled, “you could see 
that they [the Khawalids] had more power than most realized.”85 
Then, in 2008, a major clash between the crown prince and the prime minister occurred over 
the economic reforms that Prince Salman attempted to implement in his capacity as new head of 
Bahrain’s Economic Development Board (EDB). In a rare public exchange of letters, Salman 
complained to the king that some factions in the government resisted his institutional decisions, 
specifically accusing the prime minister of financing surrogates to undercut Gulf Air (the 
struggling national airline), colluding with business leaders to diminish the effect of labor 
reforms, and negating the EDB’s “one stop shop” for foreign investors by using the cabinet to 
impose additional layers of bureaucracy.
86
 In his response, King Hamad backed the crown prince 
and threatened to dismiss any minister who did not follow Prince Salman’s final authority in 
economic matters.
87
 Following this incident, the crown prince announced on 7 February 2008 the 
appointment of King Hamad’s cabinet-level economic and technical ministers to the EDB board 
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of directors, therefore essentially annexing the prime minister’s cabinet into a parallel 
government.
88
 
Despite his victory over the prime minister, the role of Prince Salman remained 
essentially limited to the economic realm, and until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, there were 
no more public confrontations between the different power centers. We therefore label this 
situation “latent crisis stage”. 
 
The Arab Spring and the Overt Crisis 
 
In February 2011, massive demonstrations exceeding 100,000 participants moved the tensions 
within the Bahraini monarchy into an overt crisis. This was first evidenced by uncoordinated 
government action: while some government representatives, including King Hamad himself, 
announced that protests would be tolerated, police forces used all means necessary to end the 
protests. The lack of a unified response was a clear sign that different factions within the 
monarchy were competing for influence and vying to impose their own course of action. The 
highly inconsistent treatment of protesters is only one of the numerous examples of such erratic 
changes in government behaviour. On 17 February, government forces caused multiple 
casualties when they used live ammunition against protesters, mourners and news reporters, yet 
only two days later protesters were allowed to return to the Pearl Roundabout and King Hamad 
offered a televised address to apologise for the deaths.
89
  
The widespread use of torture by certain branches of the security apparatus, despite direct 
orders from the crown prince for the police officials to avoid sectarian discrimination and to 
exercise restraint in dealing with protesters, offers another example of how different branches of 
government openly defied each other instead of pursuing a coherent, unified course of action.
90
 
According to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report, during the uprising, 
detainees were interrogated by three government agencies, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), the 
National Security Agency (NSA) (both led by government hardliners) and the Bahrain Defence 
Force. Whereas the first two agencies were said to have been making extensive use of torture in 
their dealings with detainees, the Bahrain Defence Force did not seem to follow the same policy 
of torture.
91
 
A few weeks after King Hamad’s 17 February televised address to the nation, Prince 
Salman reached out to a coalition of moderate opposition parties headed by Al-Wefaq and 
offered a dialogue on political reforms. His “seven principles” included a stronger elected lower 
house of parliament, fairer boundaries for electoral districts and an effort to curb official 
corruption, among other concessions.
92
 He even offered the departure of the prime minister 
within a three-month timeframe.
93
 The moderate opposition was ready to accept the crown 
prince’s invitation for dialogue.94 With this in mind, we believe that it is appropriate to conclude 
that the offer for reforms was not a simple attempt by a unified authoritarian regime to dissipate 
protests, but a real offer of compromise by regime softliners. 
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The Crown Prince in the Minority 
 
In the spring of 2011, Crown Prince Salman, found himself becoming relatively isolated. His 
main support came from his father King Hamad, who we qualify as a moderate or reluctant 
softliner. During Hamad’s reign, Bahrain had seen a series of reforms aimed at economic and 
social modernization, including the release of all political prisoners, the dissolution of the State 
Security Court and the abolition of the 1974 Decree on state security measures.
95
 He also 
expanded the rights of women and opened up some positions in the government to Shi’ites, who 
have historically been discriminated against in matters of employment in the public sector.
96
 
Finally, after the uprisings in Pearl Roundabout, King Hamad apologized for the deaths of 
protesters and promised to investigate the incidents. Later on, he showed restraint while 
demonstrations against him continued for several weeks. 
According to political sources, King Hamad first reluctantly supported Prince Salman’s 
negotiations on reform, and warned that military action would have to be considered if talks had 
not been successfully initiated within three weeks.
97
 We consider this to be evidence of King 
Hamad’s ambivalent position towards the political situation, a fact that benefitted hardliner 
elements within the regime when opposition demands became more radical. Furthermore, 
opposition within the ranks of the Khawalids was fierce. An aide to the crown prince later 
revealed in an interview that the royal court minister confronted the crown prince at a family 
meeting after Prince Salman had proposed a deal to the opposition that would have granted the 
Shi’ites a greater share in parliament, which was a historic concession. As it became clear that 
the crown prince’s position would not change, the royal court minister flew to Saudi Arabia and 
convinced King Abdullah to oppose the crown prince’s efforts, while some units of Bahrain’s 
security services began to attack opposition marches.
98
 
Other members of the royal family also opposed Prince Salman. Sheik Nasser bin Hamad 
al Khalifa, in charge of Bahrain’s Olympic athletes, made a televised address during the protests 
declaring that “anyone who called for the fall of the regime, may a wall fall on his head […] 
Whether he is an athlete, socialite or politician (whatever he is) he will be held accountable… 
Bahrain is an island and there is nowhere to escape”.99 Journalists, like Murphy, have suggested 
that media like the state-run television and press were also under the control of royal family 
hardliners, and that these hardliners worked during the first weeks of demonstrations to 
undermine Prince Salman’s efforts to begin a dialogue. For instance, the media “gave almost no 
support to dialogue and instead consistently featured Sunni extremists speaking demeaningly of 
Shi’ites, accusing them of being loyal to Iran and suggesting they leave the country”. In 
consequence, the Crown Prince found himself so marginalized that he could not carry through 
his political reform plans.
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The Armed Forces as Hardliners 
 
Prince Salman’s share of control over strategic elements such as the armed forces was weak and 
steadily declining throughout the conflict. He had formerly been the Commander in Chief of the 
Bahrain Defence Force but he lost his position in 2008 to regime hardliner Khalifa bin Ahmed al 
Khalifa. During the events of February 2011, it became clear that Salman’s control over the 
security apparatus had largely faded. Whereas he managed to order the army off the streets at the 
beginning of the protests, he was unable to prevent the army from taking over a hospital, 
destroying the symbolic Pearl Roundabout and implementing a crackdown on rioters by the end 
of February.
101
 
One major reason for this lack of control may be found in the composition of the army 
itself. Contrary to the situation in Egypt, where the armed forces emerged as the main softliners 
in the regime, Bahrain’s armed forces may be considered hardliners in that they were much more 
willing to maintain internal order on behalf of the incumbent regime. This may be explained by 
what Chenoweth and Stephan label “social distance”: when the coercive institutions are distant 
from society (e.g. members from a different country or members of a special, advantaged group), 
they are less likely to defect and more efficient for repression, as connections between the 
members and the protesters are less likely.
102
 In the case of Bahrain, where a Sunni minority 
rules over a largely Shi’ite population, a clear “Sunni bias” within the army and official 
government institutions effectively bars Shi’ites from serving in the armed forces. Additionally, 
nearly fifty per cent of the security institutions are staffed with foreigners (mostly from Pakistan 
and other Sunni-dominated Arab countries like Saudi Arabia) in order to achieve greater 
integration of the coercive apparatus into the regime and to distance the armed forces from 
society.
103
 In other words, the military personnel in Bahrain were largely Sunni, while the 
Bahraini population is seventy per cent Shi’ite. 
 
The Radicalization of Opposition Forces and the Shifting Preferences of Moderates 
 
Even though softliners within the Bahraini monarchy found themselves in a minority position 
when the Arab Spring broke out on the island, we believe that there was a real and credible 
prospect for negotiations with the moderate opposition parties until the radicalization of 
opposition demands tilted the balance within the authoritarian regime in favour of hardliners. 
At the beginning of the protests in mid-February, the uprising was not remarkably radical: 
a few hundred young people turned out in response to a call by unidentified political activists on 
Facebook. Although some activists from more militant parties took part in the demonstrations 
(for example Abdul Wahab Hussein, the head of the radical Al Wafaa party that demands the 
overthrow of the monarchy), the majority of protesters did not call for the removal of the king 
and instead demanded the transformation of Bahrain’s political system. While most activists in 
the Pearl Roundabout were Shi’ite, at the beginning of the uprising they were joined by many 
Sunni Bahrainis demonstrating for greater freedom and better living conditions.
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But when protests grew in intensity, moderate opposition parties did not keep their own 
radicals, meaning those who favoured the overthrow of the monarchy, in check. In fact, while the 
crown prince was reaching out to the main opposition coalition headed by Al-Wefaq, three 
radical Shi’ite groups (Al Haq, Wafa and the Bahrain Freedom Movement) joined together to 
form the “Coalition for a Bahraini Republic”. The leaders of these parties contended that the 
official opposition under Al-Wefaq did not represent their interests and called for the 
establishment of a “democratic republican system”;105 a move that was considered an escalation 
by both moderates and hardliners in the Bahraini authoritarian regime. There were other 
provocations by radical Shi’ite demonstrators, such as a march to Riffa (where members of the 
royal family live) on March 11, the erection of barricades on March 13 on a motorway cutting 
access to Manama’s financial district and the extension of the Pearl Roundabout protests to 
Salmaniya hospital where some of the predominantly Shi’ite medical staff criticised the 
government. We believe that the overt call for the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement 
with a democratic republic constituted the turning point that tipped the balance within the royal 
family in favour of the hardliners. As we have explained before, King Hamad himself was not a 
convinced softliner but rather a moderate who was comfortable with limited reform. When 
confronted with the demands of the radical Shi’ite coalition, we believe that King Hamad was 
frightened by the prospects of the dynasty crumbling and of an Islamic takeover. For instance, 
the government has long maintained that Al Haq has ties to Iran, and though the “Coalition” did 
not mention “Islamic” Republic, Sunnis in Bahrain believed this was tacitly understood.106 
At the same time, the slow pace of the dialogue between the crown prince and the 
umbrella of moderate opposition parties exasperated members of the royal family who felt that 
the protesters would never be satisfied.
107
 Therefore, it is plausible that the escalation of protests 
changed King Hamad’s strategic calculations and led him to prefer a takeover of hardliners in the 
regime to the detriment of the crown prince’s negotiations with the opposition. Prince Salman’s 
sudden loss of support within the regime is evidenced by the fact that he was still negotiating 
with opposition forces and trying to reach a compromise when government forces began their 
clampdown on 15 March. By the time martial law was declared, sources say that the power “to 
protect the safety of the country and its citizens” had already been transferred to Sheikh Khalifa 
bin Ahmed al Khalifa, head of the Bahrain Defence Force. Since 2011, the softliner faction 
within the Bahraini monarchy has lost much of its power. The crown prince’s most recent 
appointment as first deputy prime minister may somewhat amend the balance, although this 
remains speculative and without support from any policy changes to date.
108
 In fact, conciliatory 
statements by King Hamad aimed at the majority Shia community have not been followed up by 
action. Many of the 2,500 state employees fired for taking part in pro-democracy protests are still 
out of work while senior Bahraini police officers suspended for torturing detainees have been 
reinstated without trial.
109
 While the crown prince has regained a formal institutional role in 
                                                 
105
 Lin Noueihed, Frederik Richter and Samia Nakhoul, “Hardline Shi’ite Groups Demand Republic in Bahrain”, 
Reuters (March 8, 2011). 
106
 Murphy, “How Hardliners Ruined Chance of Compromise in Bahrain”. 
107
 Noueihed, “Analysis: Bahrain Talks Stall, Divisions Widen After Crackdown.” 
108
 Ronald Neumann, “Bahrain: A Very Complicated Little Island”, Middle East Policy 20 (2013), pp.45-58. 
109
 Patrick Cockburn, “Power Struggle Deepens Divisions Among Bahraini Royal Family”, The Independent, (Sep-
tember 27, 2011). 
New Middle Eastern Studies 5 (2015) 
19 
 
policy-making, most observers still agree that ultimately Prince Salman is still the deputy of (and 
therefore subordinate to) his great uncle Sheikh Khalifa, rather than the reverse.
110
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Before 2011, both the Bahraini and Egyptian regimes had successfully established limited 
pluralistic institutions, legislatures and multiparty systems, and allowed more free press without 
losing their grip on their respective countries. Still, intra-regime dynamics were set in motion 
which would challenge regime resilience in a period of extensive civic resistance. In Egypt, the 
clash between Gamal’s partisans, alternative security agencies and the armed forces, created 
much resentment towards Hosni Mubarak among the military elite.
111
 In Bahrain, two factions 
within the royal family struggled for domination of both the regime and its policy agenda. 
Civic protesters in 2011, in Egypt and in Bahrain, gathered the support of regime 
reformists and disgruntled groups. The military elite in Egypt sided with the protest leaders in a 
bid to remove the Gamal’s New Guard. As the Muslim Brotherhood agreed to many of the 
military elite’s demands, the latter group accepted a return to civilian rule. Disagreement among 
opposition forces opened the way for another military coup in 2013 which then ended civilian 
rule. In Bahrain, while the crown prince negotiated with the protesters in 2011, the dynastic old 
guard rapidly moved to prevent any challenge to their power. Furthermore, as the opposition 
forces began to split among radical and moderate groups, regime moderates began to side with 
the hardliners. 
Despite differences in terms of regime composition, societal characteristics and economic 
traits, Egypt and Bahrain passed through similar critical junctures in 2011. The latent crises 
within both regimes became public in periods of heightened popular mobilization as certain 
factions appealed to regime opponents in order to gain the upper hand on their rivals. The 
Bahraini case demonstrates, however, that the presence of regime reformists accompanied by 
domestic mobilisation is not a sufficient condition for regime change; the regime hardliners, 
thanks in large part to its control over the military, overpowered the regime opponents and side-
lined regime reformists. 
As our analysis also demonstrates, the outcome of an overt crisis is also influenced by the 
opposition movement’s characteristics. In both cases, anti-regime protests attracted large crowds. 
As radical groups tried to take-over the protests in Bahrain, moderate leaders’ ability to negotiate 
with regime representatives was diminished as the declarations by radicals were used by the 
hardliners to sway moderates. In Egypt, the relative unity of the opposition movement in 
January-February 2011 enabled certain opposition leaders to convince the military to not only 
purge their opponents within the regime but to push Hosni Mubarak to resign and to initiate a 
political transition. The failure of the opposition to agree on a reform agenda in the subsequent 
year and to oppose a return to military rule in 2013 enabled the military to return to power. 
In both cases, the military played a critical role in the final outcome of the Arab Spring. 
Hosni Mubarak’s lack of control over the military elite meant that he could not order them to 
crush the protesters while the Bahraini security forces responded to the calls by the regime 
hardliners to violently suppress the protests. The presence of rival security institutions in Egypt 
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was one of the main factors that diminished Mubarak’s hold on the military. Conversely, in 
Bahrain, selective (Sunni) recruitment in the military explains in part the military’s willingness 
to repress Shi’ite protesters. The effects of military policies on soldier’s loyalty to ruling elites 
should be considered in future research. 
The argument in this article was that societal pressure can lead to regime change only when 
(1) there are already fractures within the ruling elite and (2) where the most powerful factions 
within the elite can be swayed to back a regime transition. The ability of opponents to convince 
ruling elites to support a transition depends on a number of characteristics including the strength 
of the protests, and the ability of opposition leaders to both remain united and limit their 
demands for reforms. Future research on regime change/resilience should assess how overt crises 
can challenge regime stability. While institutional characteristics can help us to understand 
which social forces are critical to regime survival, institutional analyses do not grasp intra-
regime dynamics which can pose a serious challenge to the maintenance of the status quo. 
Similarly, analysis of civic resistance campaigns often fail to consider how ruling cliques can set 
in place measures which prevent elite defection by affecting the relative distribution of power 
among political factions. Only an analysis that takes into account how the mobilization of 
domestic opponents affects intra-regime rivalries can explain the dynamics of regime resilience. 
